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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent

:

VS.

:

DAVID R. WARDEN,

:

De fendant/Appe11ant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Case No. 880575-CA

:

Defendant was initially tried by jury beginning November
16, 1987; however, the Court declared a mistrial on November 18,
1987 due to improper testimony given by one of the State's
witnesses.

A second jury trial was held beginning February 22,

1988 and continuing through February 26, 1988. Defendant was
convicted of the offense of Negligent Homicide as charged.
The case was reviewed by the Court of Appeals and on
November 22, 1989, the Court ruled by written opinion that the
conviction should be reversed based on insufficiency of the
evidence based upon the State's failure to establish a
"substantial and unjustifiable risk of death."

Although the

Defendant did allege in his appeal the insufficiency of evidence,
his argument was that the State had failed to prove causation.
The issue of nature and degree of risk was neither briefed nor
argued before the court.

Petitioner does not contest the court's

authority to review the matter sua sponte on that issue, but
requests an opportunity for rehearing to fully address the issue
before the court.
1

NOW THEREFORE, COMES NOW the State of Utah and petitions
the Court for a rehearing pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. Melvin C. Wilson, Davis County Attorney,
and Brian J. Namba, Deputy Davis County Attorney, certify herein
that the petition is presented in good faith and not for delay.
POINT I.
THE COURT MISAPPREHENDED OR MISINTERPRETED THE
STANDARD OF REVIEW BY FINDING THAT A JURY
"COULD HAVE" FOUND REASONABLE DOUBT RATHER
THAN THAT THE JURY "COULD NOT HAVE BUT" FOUND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Petitioner claims the following point of law has been
overlooked or misapprehended by the Court in rendering its
decision:
In reviewing the conviction, we do not
substitute our judgment for that of the jury.
*It is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses....' State v.
Lamm, 606 P.2d 229,231 (Utah 1980); accord
State v. Linden. 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (Utah
1983) .
So long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences from which findings of
all the requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. State
v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 at 345 (Utah 1985).
The Court correctly cited the standard of review
enunciated in State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 433, 424 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 245 (Utah 1985), quoting
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).
The court's opinion indicates that the court failed to
adhere to that standard in the instant case:
2

"Thus, reasonable minds could examine the
evidence presented and entertain a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime
of which he was convicted." opinion at p. 8
That statement is clearly not the standard established
by the cases cited.

Under the established standard, the court

should only overturn the conviction if "...reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d
443, 444 (Utah 1983), emphasis added.
The court further misapplied the standard of review in
its assessment of the evidence:
This response merely reinforces our conclusion
that his testimony, as well as that of the
other experts for the State, must be construed
in light of the fact that home delivery,
though legal, is not a widespread practice by
doctors in Utah." opinion at p. 8 (emphasis
added)
By making that conclusion, the court has removed from
the jury the function of assessing the weight of the evidence.
"To establish criminal negligence, it is
necessary to show conduct which is 'a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.'...It is therefore a subjective
element requiring consideration of all
relevant circumstances surrounding the
incident." State v. Ruben, 663 P.2d 445 (Utah
1983) .
The State's expert witness was examined with regard to
his attitudes and prejudices regarding home delivery.

The jury

is at liberty to consider those factors as well as the highly
specialized training and qualifications of the witness in
3

assessing the credibility of the witness. To defense counsel's
question regarding the witness's opinion of home delivery, the
witness responded as follows:
Q: Now, Doctor, with reference to home
deliveries — and let's talk philosophically
now a bit in the medical field. With
reference to home deliveries, as a
neonatologist, it's my understanding that your
professional view is that they should not
occur?
A: That's, to me, a naive approach to the
problem because it does occur and I think home
deliveries are appropriate in many
circumstances. (T. Vol.V p.266)
The witness was further questioned about the standard of
practice in the medical community regarding home births, which he
openly admitted was not favorable. To say that the testimony of
an expert must be construed in a particular light based on the
practice of the medical community and not on the expert's own
practice or opinion is inconsistent with the standard of review
established under Utah law.
POINT II.
THE STATE MET IT'S BURDEN TO PROVE CRIMINAL
NEGLIGENCE BY PROVING A SUBSTANTIAL AND
UNJUSTIFIABLE RISK THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES
EXISTED AND FURTHER THAT THE RESULT WOULD
OCCUR.
This court ruled that the State failed to meet it's
burden to prove criminal negligence by failing to prove a
"substantial and unjustifiable risk".

In a prosecution for

second degree murder under U.C.A. 76-5-203 (c), the State must
prove a "grave risk of death"; however, in the case of
manslaughter or negligent homicide, the risk element applies to
4

either (a) that the circumstances exist, or (b) that the result
will occur. U.C.A. 76-2-103 (3) and (4).
In this case the State may prove criminal negligence by
proving a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, or a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that Jareth Young's diagnosed
condition would progress and that Ivy Young would not recognize
the symptoms.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in State v. Bolsinaer
699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985) that a jury could take into account
several factors in evaluating conduct:
In Neitzel. supra, the court enumerated
four determining factors a jury should be
asked when it evaluates conduct resulting in
death and alleged to be depraved indifference:
(1) the utility of the defendant's conduct,
(2) the magnitude of the risk, (3) the
defendant's knowledge of the risk, (4) any
precautions taken by the defendant to minimize
the risk. Bolsinaer at 1220, referring to
Neitzel v. State, 655 P.2d 325 (Alaska
App.1982)
The jury was entitled to assess each of the above
factors in relation to this case to determine whether the
defendant was criminally negligent. The court should not reverse
the jury's conclusions unless it finds there is no evidence to
support those conclusions.
1.

THE UTILITY OF DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT.

It is

undisputed that the family requested a home delivery and that
there is some social utility to the practice of home birth. The
question is what social utility there was to leaving Jareth Young
in his diseased condition in the care of ivy Young, an
5

inexperienced lay person.

The jury was entitled to accept the

testimony of Ivy Young that the defendant left her with no
instructions as to what to watch for and that Ivy Young asked the
defendant if the victim ought not be hospitalized.

The jury is

further entitled to question the utility of Defendant's failure
to diligently attend his patients before and after delivery.
The jury should further be able to assess the social
utility of practicing home birth medicine while not maintaining
malpractice insurance and not being authorized to admit patients
into a hospital.
2.

MAGNITUDE OF THE RISK. The magnitude of the risk

can best be assessed by the amount that the risk of death is
increased by defendant's decision to leave the victim in the care
of a lay person, the grandmother, Ivy Young.

Dr. Chan testified

that so doing increased the probability of death ten to twenty
times.
The single most important factor in determining the
nature and magnitude of the risk is the fact that Hyaline
Membrane Disease is a progressive disease.

That is, given all

infants of this gestational age who contract the disease, five to
fifteen percent can be expected to die without medical
intervention.
progresses.

The probability of death increases as the disease

The experts agreed that as medical intervention

became necessary, time became an increasingly important factor.
3.

THE DEFENDANT'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE RISK.

Defendant

acknowledged on the witness stand that he had diagnosed the
6

disease, that he was aware it was progressive in nature, and that
it was potentially fatal (T. Vol. IV, p.176).

He had even made

the determination that the baby would be better off in the
hospital (T. Vol. IV, p.174).

Sharon Johnson asked Defendant if

the child shouldn't be hospitalized but he told her it wouldn't
be necessary (T. Vol. IV, p.126).
4.
RISK.

PRECAUTIONS TAKEN BY THE DEFENDANT TO MINIMIZE THE

Emphasis has been placed by both the State and the

Defendant upon the decision to leave the victim in the care of a
lay person, the grandmother.

That act alone, however, is not the

only act for which Defendant should be held accountable.
Consideration should be given to the immediate prenatal care or
lack thereof, and the total absence of a reasonable course of
follow-up care after the birth.

The jury instruction given by

the court stated:
The standard of care to be applied in
this case is that which is applicable to a
physician practicing general medicine in
connection with the pregnancy, labor, delivery
and aftercare of a mother and newborn infant
in the circumstances of this case. (R. at page
53)
The Defendant failed to minimize the risks that existed
early in the day prior to delivery.

He knew that the established

due date was several weeks off yet he failed to personally attend
the patient, a fact the defendant admitted on the witness stand
was an error in judgment (T. Vol.IV, p.163).
The Defendant could have minimized the risk of premature
birth by Tocolysis (T. Vol.Ill, p.179).
7

He could have slowed

the onset of labor by methods available in a homebirth setting
(T. Vol.IV, p.131).

He could then have had the baby delivered in

a hospital setting, as would have been his own normal practice
even under these conditions, since he would not normally deliver
a premature baby in a home (T. Vol.IV, p.149).

He further

admitted that Tocolysis in a hospital setting was within his own
practice (T. Vol.IV, p.131).
While the defendant was still in the home during the
immediate aftercare of the baby, he failed to take precautions
which could have saved the life of the baby.

He could have

immediately hospitalized the baby, an alternative within his
practice (T. Vol.Ill, p.126).
the home himself.

He could have remained longer in

He could have arranged for a nurse or other

trained professional to monitor the progress of the disease. He
could have provided Ivy Young with a specific list of symptoms
with an objective standard for observation.

He could have

provided Ivy with a protocol for action more thorough than just
to call him.
After the Defendant left the home he committed the
greatest failure to minimize the risk.

He knew that the disease

was progressive and that the probability of survival decreased as
the disease progressed yet he failed to call on the Youngs until
noon the next day (T. Vol.IV, p.111).
The Defendant lives less than five blocks from the
Youngs (T. Vol.IV, p.162).

His office is six to eight blocks

from the Youngs (T. Vol.IV, p.158).

He had ample opportunity

to visit or call upon the Youngs, but did not.
8

In this regard, the testimony that the infant might have
survived if he had been hospitalized up to ten hours after birth
underscores the duty of the Defendant to have checked on the baby
within that time period.

At approximately six and one-half hours

after the birth, Defendant was awake, reading National Geographic
(T. Vol.IV, p.105).

He remained at home for some time before

leaving to play raquetball at a club that did not open until
eight and one-half hours after the birth (T. Vol.IV, p.105).

Had

he called on the Youngs at that time, he would have learned that
Jareth was continuing to make grunting sounds and had an abnormal
color (T. Vol.1, p.91).
He returned from raquetball to his office about ten
hours after the birth (T. Vol.IV, p.107).

Had he checked with

the Youngs at that time, he would have learned that the baby had
stopped breathing at one time (T. Vol.1, p.94) and that Ivy was
trying to contact him.
POINT III.
THE FACTS RELIED UPON BY THE COURT TO FIND
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ARE UNRELIABLE AND
CONTROVERTED BY CONFLICTING EVIDENCE.
The court has misapprehended the statement of the
witness regarding the "statistic" that only two percent of babies
die of untreated Hyaline Membrane Disease.

Indeed, the statistic

of two percent is not even the testimony of the witness, but a
creation of defense counsel in intense and confusing crossexamination.
The witness first stated clearly on direct examination
that failure to provide therapy to an infant suffering from
9

Hyaline Membrane Disease at 33 to 34 weeks gestation created a
probability of death of five, ten, or fifteen percent.
Defense counsel created the two percent figure by first
subtracting the lowest figure in the witness's statistic, that
being 5%, from 100%, thus leaving 95% as representing the figure
to be the expected number of survivors of the disease without
treatment.

Then counsel asked him on the stand to multiply that

figure by 25%, a figure previously offered as the percentage of
infants born at 33-34 weeks gestation who develop Hyaline
Membrane Disease. The witness accepted a figure of 2% which was
blurted out by an observer in the courtroom.

The accurate result

of that computation would be 23.75%, nothing near the 2% computed
under pressure.

Furthermore, had the computation been accurately

performed, it would not have resulted in a meaningful statistic
because the 95% statistic was already limited to the 25% of all
infants born at 33-34 weeks gestation who develop the disease.
It was out of frustration from the confusing form of
cross-examination that the witness tried to clarify by saying, "I
guess the message is it's very unusual and rare to lose a baby at
this gestation and this birth weight from Hyaline Membrane
Disease."

That is, the loss of this infant was a senseless and

preventable event.
Defense counsel then made clear to the witness that he
wanted to discuss the question of morbidity when there is
treatment compared to when there is no treatment.

The witness

agreed to discuss those statistics with the caveat that they
10

relate only to a hospital setting where the babies are under
observation by trained professionals.

The context of that

statement in the trial transcript is as follows:
Q: Untreated it could be in the hospital
or it could b e — i t doesn't matter where it is,
I suggest. The bottom line is that the child
is untreated; therefore, if you have Hyaline
Membrane, 33 to 34 weeks and it's untreated, 2
percent, two out of a hundred may die?
A. We're not talking apples and oranges.
If the baby is in the hospital and it's —
see, there's no study where you say this baby
will be treated and this baby will not be
treated. I'm giving you the statistics of all
babies in the hospital being watched and
there's some babies you watch carefully and
they don't need any treatment, don't require
any treatment, and those babies — and if you
say yes, if you're looking at those babies
that are not treated, very few of them will
die (T. Vol.Ill, p.260).
It would be both unethical and inhumane to do a study in
a hospital in which patients exhibiting symptoms requiring
therapy are divided into two groups, one which will be treated
and one which will not.

The statistics quoted by the witness

were for patients who were not treated because in the opinion of
their physicians, therapy was not required.

Under those

circumstances, very few will die.
Further, on re-direct the witness clarified his
position:
Q: Now, we've had some talk about
percentages and it's a little bit confusing,
so I just want to recap a bit. From the point
of view of the doctor, leaving the home 30
minutes after the birth of the baby, given the
factors that the baby is 33 to 34 weeks in
gestation, that it's four pounds, that it's
got some blueness in its extremities and that
it's making the grunting sounds, what can you
say about that baby?
11

A. That baby had respiratory distress
syndrome. That baby is having respiratory
problems. That baby is sick.
Q. All right. Now, do you say anything
with regard to the probability of its dying
from that disease if it's untreated or left in
the care of a lay person?
A. I think to leave a baby with Hyaline
Membrane Disease with a lay person just
creates increased problems of mortality for
that baby, morbidity.
Q. Can you give us any kind of a
quantitative objective basis that we can
develop as to what the degree of risk there is
for that baby left in the care of a lay
person?
A. It is very high. You could say 10,
20 — 20 times higher when left to a lay
person to manage the baby (T. Vol.Ill, pp.278279) .
Thus, beginning with the figure of 2% as the mortality
rate for infants 33-34 weeks gestation with Hyaline Membrane
Disease and untreated if left in the care of a lay person where
the mortality rate increases 10 to 20%, risk of death to Jareth
Young was 20 to 40%. Such a risk is certainly substantial and
unjustifiable, particularly when the normal course that would
have been followed by this Defendant (to not deliver premature
babies in the home, T. Vol.IV, p.149) would have reduced the risk
to 1%.
The court relies on statements by the State's witnesses
that the victim's vital signs were "acceptable."
is based on the objective Apgar score only.

This conclusion

The physicians

agreed that a score of "8" was an acceptable score but cautioned
that if the other characteristics of this child were taken into
consideration it would have to be concluded that this was not a
well baby (T. Vol.Ill, pp.194-195 also p.255).
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There is a real danger in this case of relying too
heavily upon statistics and objective scores to determine the
degree of risk.

Although both the State and Defendant have

presented statistics, the determination of criminal negligence
should not be established by percentages of morbidity.

It is to

be determined by a subjective standard rather than an objective
standard. State v. Ruben, supra at 448. Excessive reliance on
objective scores detracts from the jury's duty to view all the
circumstances.
POINT IV
A FINDING THAT THE JURY COULD HAVE FOUND FROM
THE EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS CRIMINALLY
NEGLIGENT IS CONSISTENT WITH CASE LAW IN UTAH
AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS.
A reasonable jury could have concluded that the risk to
Jareth Young was substantial and unjustifiable.

Indeed, the Utah

Supreme Court has found the evidence sufficient to sustain a
finding of criminal negligence in death cases involving less
probability of death.

See State v. Hallet, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah

1980) where the court found sufficient evidence to sustain a
conviction of negligent homicide where defendant, acting as an
accomplice, bent down a stop sign so it was not visible from the
lane of travel; State v. McPhee 684 P.2d 57 (Utah 1984) where the
evidence in an automobile homicide consisted of evidence of
drinking, a state of intoxication so as to cause staggering and
slurred speech and evidence of crossing three lanes of travel
into the wrong lane of an intersecting street.
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The Court cites case law dealing with "bad judgment" by
a physician.

This case is factually more consistent with the

Montana case of State v. Hoffman, 639 P.2d 567 (Montana 1982)
where a mother was found guilty of negligent homicide for failure
to provide medical treatment for her son. The subject of failure
to provide medical treatment is dealt with in Homicide—Lack of
Medical Attention. 100 A.L.R.2d 483 (1965).
The defendant in this case was neither qualified nor
authorized to provide the treatment which would have saved this
infant's life. His duty of care more closely resembles that of a
parent or other person with a contractual duty of care than that
of a physician. What was termed "bad judgment" was not his
decision to treat or not treat, but rather whether to refer the
case to a qualified neonatologist for treatment.
CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case is highly controverted and
subject to multiple interpretations.

The jury deliberated under

proper instructions and rendered a verdict consistent with those
instructions and supported by the evidence. The verdict should
therefore be upheld and the court should not substitute it's own
interpretation of the evidence.
-7/

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this/] Q I

day of December, 1989.

Brian J. Namba
Attorney y£or Plaintiff/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE
WE CERTIFY, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure that the above petition for rehearing is made
in good faith and not intended for delayA

Brian J. N^mi^t^
Attorney fpjr Plaint iff/Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that on the

day of December,

1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for
Rehearing was mailed with postage prepaid thereon, to Darwin C.
Hansen, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, 8th Floor, Kearns
Building, 136 South Main, Salt Lake City UT
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